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Abstract 
Due to China’s ongoing economic rise, recent studies in global (economic) history 
have moved away from the traditional Eurocentric view to a Sinocentric one. There is 
extensive literature focused on the introduction of Chinese goods to Europe, as well 
as on China’s economic development within the framework of the great divergence 
debate. However, less research has centred on the introduction of European goods to 
Chinese markets, specifically the markets in Guangdong or other coastal regions 
(such as Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu), before the First Opium War. This paper aims 
to side-step the Sinocentric approach, eschewing the current wave of national history 
in China, by analysing the international trade in Qing China from the Kangxi era until 
the Qianlong period. It provides new empirical evidence from the First Historical 
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Archives of China (FHAC) by examining the impact on global trade of China’s 
imperial edicts and interventionist policies.  
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This essay focuses on the introduction of European goods to Macao-Canton for the 
period when the Canton System was established by the Qianlong emperor in 1757 in 
order to control western trade. The period from 1680 to 1757, which covers the reigns 
of Kangxi, Yongzheng and the first decades of Qianlong, was more open to 
international trade, putting an end to the tribute system.1 In both periods, the opening 
to overseas trade by the Kangxi emperor and the control of foreign trade by Qianlong 
influenced merchants’ drive to introduce European goods to China and to exchange 
American silver for Chinese goods destined for the West.2 
This study will show how the Qing bureaucracy was inefficient in assessing and 
collecting customs revenues at multiple ports along the coast, a context that might 
explain the decision to centralise flows of exports as well as imports at Canton. 
However, even there the bureaucracy was incompetent, corrupt and beyond central 
control. Despite their anti-western rhetoric, these three emperors increased the volume 
of western imports into China. As we will demonstrate, the proclaimed antipathy of 
these emperors to exchanges and interactions with foreigners was based far more on a 
policy to control local Chinese merchants than a desire for autarky, which was not 
sustainable once population growth accelerated and Chinese agriculture could not 
produce enough food. 
The impact of the circulation of Asian and Chinese goods in European societies 
has been widely studied, whereas there has been less research dealing with the 
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introduction of American and European goods in late Ming and Qing China.3 In fact, 
there is a scholarly lacuna on the introduction of western commodities in Qing China, 
which arrived mainly through the Macao-Canton economic axis, and the distribution 
of such goods to coastal and inner areas of China.4 The impact of global trade in 
regional economies of south China (mainly in the local communities of Fujian and 
Guangdong) and how this compared with the performance of the whole Chinese 
economy, along with state intervention during the Qianlong reign when the Canton 
System was implemented, requires further study.  
To fully understand the China trade, merchants’ motivations, alliances and the 
intervention of the state in local and international trade, it is important to analyse how 
the import and export trade in China was shaped by the Qing state, mainly because of 
the Canton System. Research that seeks out the connections, differences and 
similarities between European and Chinese markets could help to increase our 
knowledge of the China trade. Therefore, our methodology involves the use and 
analysis of primary sources from the First Historical Archives of China (FHAC) 
[zhōngguó dìyī lìshǐ dàngànguǎn 中国第一历史档案馆], located at the Forbidden 
City in Beijing.  
 
The making of the Canton System: Why had Canton become the main entrepôt 
for foreign trade by 1840?  
Chinese historians traditionally analyse the economic performance of the Middle 
3 
 
Kingdom during the Qing period on a local level without seeking connections and/or 
comparisons with the rest of the world. Such scholarship conventionally takes the 
Opium War and/or the “Daoguang economic depression” as the catalysts for the 
secular economic recession in nineteenth-century China, which put an end to the 
prosperous economy of the eighteenth-century Qing period.5 This transition 
established 1840 as the boundary between early modern and modern Chinese history.6 
The logic for this is based on the thinking of Marxist historians, who were more 
concerned with the country’s socio-political conditions. They argued that “the 
outbreak of the Opium War and the signing of the Sino-British Nanjing Treaty 
transformed China from a feudal society to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society.”7 
In addition, the whole of the eighteenth century saw territorial expansion, frontier 
incorporation, economic growth, population boom, urbanization, cultural 
sophistication, and intensified global trade. Commonly called the Prosperous Age of 
the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, this period suddenly ended during the 
transition into the nineteenth century.8  
The performance of the Chinese economy and its recession, in the transition from 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, has generally been regarded in Chinese 
scholarship as very susceptible to external events. They consider the interference of 
foreign powers, such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, among others, in the 
Chinese economy led to China’s disastrous socio-economic development in mid- and 
late Qing China. This has also fed the sentiment of victimization in the Chinese public 
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psyche, which has also reached academic circles, where Westerners are seen as 
invaders and, therefore, as responsible for China’s failure to modernise. Li Bozhong 
argues that “a profound inferiority complex [qíngjié 情结] developed in the Chinese 
public psyche from China’s perceived backwardness relative to the West since the 
mid-nineteenth century.”9 This outlook became more ingrained when, more recently, 
scholars attempted to compare the modernisation of Qing China, under the Tongzhi 
reforms, with the Japan economic take-off during the Meiji Restoration.10  
However, if we adopt a global history perspective, this description of China’s 
economic development looks a bit narrow, as any analysis of China’s economic 
performance should also consider the domestic economic swings and the effects of the 
highly interventionist Qing state, mainly during the Qianlong reign. China had been 
deeply involved in the world trade system since Spain reached the New World in the 
late fifteenth century and the Portuguese started to settle down in Macao during the 
sixteenth century. In this period, long before the Opium War, trade between China, 
south-eastern Asian regions and Europe flourished. Traditional Chinese scholarship 
describes the Canton System, established during the Qianlong period, as “a sign of 
closing the country.”11 This measure grew from the Qianlong emperor’s order to the 
governor of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces [Liang Guang Zong Du 两广总督] in 
1757 to “tell foreign businessmen that in the future they only could trade in 
Guangdong (Canton) and are not allowed to go to Ningbo. If there is any violation, 
they must escort the ship to return to Guangdong.”12   
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However, even before Qianlong’s edict, Canton was clearly the main import and 
export channel of Sino-European trade and occupied a strategic trade location in the 
Pearl River Delta, connecting with Macao where ships and their cargoes were 
supervised by the customs superintendents, popularly known as “hoppos.”13 The 
connection with Macao, where western communities (traders, diplomats, 
missionaries) were hosted, and southeast Asia (mainly Manila as Spanish entrepôt in 
the Pacific that connected the south China trade with the Americas), as well as interior 
provinces of China, made Canton the axis of global trade networks between European 
empires and the Middle Kingdom.14 One of the most obvious reasons for restricting 
trade to the port at Canton was to make commerce more controllable and taxable by 
Qing officials as large ships could not easily navigate the narrow Canton river, which 
passed the Whampoa and Hanan islands, whereas in Macao ships could sail offshore 
and thus evade the control of the Qing authorities.15 The Yongzheng emperor had 
attempted to control commerce in Canton by expelling the missionaries in 1724. 
However, it was the Qianlong emperor who finally established the Canton System to 
reinforce the overseas trade policy, eliminating the possibility for foreign ships to 
trade at ports outside Canton until 1840.   
The evolution of the Canton System was the result of a number of factors such as the 
inability of the Qing state to collect customs revenues at multiple ports, the 
advantages of Canton’s location, regional economic development, strong 
interventionism of the state (echoing the European mercantilist bans) and the Qing 
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regime’s political and economic strategy. Another variable to consider for imposing 
one single port for foreign commerce [yīkǒu tōngshāng 一口通商] was the desire to 
control trade through official institutions and channels in order to eradicate 
contraband and smuggling activities, which were deeply rooted in the economic 
activities of business elites and families controlling commerce in south China.16 
Illegal or private imports and trade were rife among the officials and Qing bureaucrats 
who dealt with commerce, as well as among the Huizhou traders that controlled the 
salt monopoly trade.17 Therefore, while the Canton System might have seemed to be 
directed mainly at foreign traders, the goal of controlling the local traders in China 
was also a vital concern. Directly interfering with the local traders was a risky move, 
however, especially given that the Qing dynasty was Manchu (a foreign dynasty) and 
not Han (the local dynasty). Stirring up resentment among the Han could have serious 
consequences for the survival of the dynasty, as the threat of uprisings and rebellions 
was very real. Enforcement by the emperor of new polices and bans on local traders 
may well have provoked a violent revolt. The aim was thus to restrict all foreign trade 
to one location that could be controlled from Beijing.  
Since 1683, the Kangxi emperor had allowed maritime trade through the 
Jiang/Jiangsu Customs [jiāng hǎiguān 江海关], Zhe/Zhejiang/Ningbo Customs [zhè 
hǎiguān 浙海关, Min/Fujian Customs [mǐn hǎiguān 闽海关] and Yue/Canton 
Customs [yuè hǎiguān 粤海关].18 As one of the four major customs offices opened 
during the early and mid-Qing dynasty, the Canton Customs had the same function as 
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the other three, but its special feature was its connection with Macao, a strategic port 
for foreign trade. Thus, Canton had always been a major port for foreign merchant 
ships (figure 1). The other three customs offices were also responsible for foreign 
trade, but they functioned with a more unstructured system. This demonstrates the 
incapacity of the central state, the Qing court of Beijing, to regulate foreign trade 
through provincial institutions.  
 
Figure 1: Canton in 1670 
This small print of the city of Canton shows sailing boats and junks trading in the port 
between the river and walled city. Illustrations were taken from early historical sources. 
Courtesy of Zhongguo tongshangtu: 17-19 shiji xifang renyan zhong de zhongguo, Beijing: 
Beijing Ligongdaxue chunbanshe, 2008. 
 
A memorandum written by Hao Yulin 郝玉麟, governor of Fujian and Zhejiang 
provinces, to the Qianlong emperor in 1737 reveals the structural inadequacy of the 
Min Customs in dealing with foreign merchants, particularly through the negligence 
and lack of procedures of this official institution and its bureaucrats for tax 
collection.19 A case in point: in August of 1737, a Luzon ship carrying goods such as 
logwood arrived to trade in the port of Xiamen, Fujian province. To determine the tax 
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due, local officials searched previous records. They found that an English ship had 
come to the Min Customs two years earlier, in 1735, and that the Canton Customs 
determined that, apart from the regular tax assigned, they should also charge 0.049 per 
cent per tael of silver of the money which foreign merchants bring to purchase goods 
in China, a tax called fen tou yin 分头银. Further, 0.1 per cent per tael of silver, called 
jiao song yin 缴送银, should be charged along with 90 other forms of fee collection.  
The Min Customs did not complete the tax report for the British ship, which 
sailed back to Canton. Later, in 1737, they mistakenly charged the same tax bracket as 
the British and European ships for the cargo that had arrived from Luzon (in the 
Philippines). Zhun Tai 准泰, the former governor of Guangdong and Guangxi 
Provinces, reported to his officials that foreign merchant ships, from neighbouring 
areas of south-eastern Asia, such as Luzon, should not be charged the 0.049 per cent 
fen tou yin tax. Such charges were only to be applied to ships coming from distant 
countries, namely ships from Europe.  
Following previous research on tax collection in coastal areas of China (mainly 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces) we should ask whether this apparent negligence of 
local officials was a result of their incapacity to perform their task or because of 
personal alliances with local elites and foreign traders seeking to divert taxes.20 
Ultimately, the Min Customs refunded the fen tou yin to the Luzon ship. Similarly, in 
1755 when a British ship tried to trade at the Zhe Customs, the incumbent governor of 
Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, Ka’erjishan 喀尔吉善, quickly reported this to the 
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Qianlong emperor and a new tax rule was drafted.21 Importantly, these imperial 
reports reflect the official situation, as they were the only channel of communication 
between the emperor and local officials. To obtain an accurate view of the economic 
system and the incapacity of the state to negotiate with local elites and manage an 
efficient system of tax collection, we should, as Peter Perdue suggests, observe the 
biographies and personal trajectories of local officials. Often these bureaucrats were 
involved in trade or smuggling activities, and their families made a fortune and passed 
the Chinese Imperial examination system as a result of their social promotion in 
business.22 This local approach allows us to better understand the functioning of 
long-distance business partnerships between local traders of south China with 
westerners, as well as the global conjunctures in Chinese localities and villages.23  
Therefore, we might conclude that the management of foreign trade was 
ineffectual in the coastal regions of China, where the Jiang/Jiangsu Customs [jiāng 
hǎiguān 江海关], Zhe/Zhejiang/Ningbo Customs [zhè hǎiguān 浙海关, Min/Fujian 
Customs [mǐn hǎiguān 闽海关] and Yue/Canton Customs [yuè hǎiguān 粤海关] 
were established by Kangxi and continued by Yongzheng, until Qianlong restricted 
foreign trade to Canton. Indeed, the tax system was quite disorganised, and 
bureaucratic negligence was common among officials, who received low salaries 
from the central government in Beijing.24 An unofficial system therefore emerged, 
based on alliances and business partnerships between local and foreign traders who 
diverted funds and tax revenues to increase their personal fortunes.  
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It was extremely difficult for the government to control this unofficial system 
based on trade circuits, which then continued over generations, contributing to the 
status and honour of local families who displayed their economic and political power 
in their genealogies. This demonstrated the inability of the Qing state to create a solid 
system of tax collection and management of trade revenues and economic resources.25 
Canton was in a strategic geographical location for the export and import of goods, 
and became a major hub of foreign trade, but it was mainly seen as a way of 
controlling local trade and supervising the elites who made their fortunes and built 
their family reputations by dealing with foreign partners and accumulating highly 
valued American silver coins.26   
The Qianlong emperor’s 1757 decree formally blocked the entry of foreign 
merchant ships to the three ports in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. But why did the 
emperor choose Canton? Although Guangdong had a long history of foreign trade 
because of its geographical location, foreign trade was concentrated in Canton mainly 
because the Qing state was incapable of collecting taxes in several ports, leading to 
the centralization of imports and exports in one single port. When the decree was 
issued, foreigners were forbidden from living in Guangdong, and therefore most of 
them resided in Macao. This made Macao the cornerstone of trade and socio-cultural 
exchanges between China and the West. This policy sought to control the foreign 
community in China, as well as to attempt to regulate the unofficial trade activities 
between south China gentry and foreign merchants. Central government officials, 
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local Canton officials, as well as the Canton Customs formed a large group of interest, 
developing an informal network, and, ultimately, an unofficial long-lasting 
partnership against the state. This was rooted in the early Qing dynasty and even long 
before during the Ming dynasty.27 The Canton Customs collected a large amount of 
tax revenue every year for the national treasury. Personnel working at the Canton 
Customs, such as directors, secretaries and clerks, were recruited directly by the 
court.28  
From the Kangxi to Daoguang eras, which saw five emperors within nearly 200 
years, the official appointments to the Canton Customs fostered an ecosystem based 
on unofficial trade reaching the entire Guangdong region. During Kangxi’s reign, the 
position of customs superintendents (the hoppos) was created to eradicate corruption 
and to prevent the misappropriation of customs revenues. The positions of Canton 
Customs supervisor [Yue Hai Guan Jian Du 粤海关监督] and governor of the 
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces were known to be very lucrative and only 
favourites of the Emperor were appointed to these roles. Local officials and even the 
emperor himself pocketed part of the revenue collected. Any staff member or soldier 
who worked in the Canton Customs could find opportunities for corruption in foreign 
trade, thus boosting their personal careers and family fortunes.  
According to a memorandum addressed to the Qianlong emperor in 1742, written 
by a Canton Customs supervisor called Yilaqi 伊拉齐, there were 47 customs ports 
under the jurisdiction of Canton Customs, from Guangzhou to Macao, Qiongzhou, 
12 
 
Chaozhou, Huizhou, Gaozhou, etc. The Canton Customs supervisor – along with at 
least 30 subordinates – spent two months inspecting the area of his jurisdiction but he 
was not able to visit all the ports in person.29 Because of the extensive bureaucracy of 
the Canton Customs and its reliance on clerks and sub-officials whose salaries – and 
skill level – were low, the whole network of Canton Customs officials was closely 
associated with merchants. The family wealth accumulated by those officials mainly 
came from trade activities.   
These trade networks can be divided into three groups: Hong merchants, foreign 
merchants and local merchants.30 All were under the direct supervision of customs 
superintendents [hùbù 户部 or hoppos] and the governor of Guangxi and Guangdong 
province [dūfǔ 督抚].31 The Hong merchants were the only officially designated 
brokers who could trade with foreign agents. The activities of foreign merchants in 
Guangzhou, whether selling their own goods or buying Chinese goods, or even 
paying taxes, were all subject to the supervision of the Hong merchants. These Hong 
merchants were extremely wealthy, had close ties to the local officials and were also 
responsible for arranging overseas capital (through long-distance partnerships) and 
the import of goods. Foreign merchants introduced overseas goods to China through 
the Macao-Canton economic axis, which became the main channel for the trade and 
exchange of goods between China and southeast Asia, Japan, and the Americas, and 
ultimately with Europe.32 Local Chinese merchants were the main social agents 
involved in purchasing goods from overseas and inland Chinese regions, serving as 
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mediators and brokers in Guangdong and introducing foreign goods to other regions 
of China. This system developed a dense micro-network in south China in which a 
large group of people was involved in these trade activities; it was difficult for the 
state to control and regulate this network, which naturally established its own rules 
and modus operandi.33 The destruction of this unofficial system would have damaged 
the employment and livelihoods of not only the staff of the Canton Customs, but also 
the wider group of related practitioners – merchants, craftsmen, deliverymen, brokers, 
among others.  
In 1755, the English merchant James Flint 洪仁辉 arrived at the Zhejiang 
Customs, and while the Zhejiang officials sought to open trade with foreigners, 
opening trade was against the interests of the Canton group. The Qianlong emperor 
subsequently issued a decree stipulating that all foreign merchant ships must return to 
Canton for trade. Qianlong’s reign was defined by rigidity and strong command; 
indeed, he was a paradigm of the “mercantilist ruler.” He wanted to rule with a firm 
hand, to be seen as a good lord to his subjects, as well to protect the Han culture from 
western invaders, despite the fact that, as a Manchu ruler, he was himself a foreigner. 
Scholars consider the well-known Flint Affair [Hong Renhui Shijian, 洪任辉事件] as 
the event that made Qianlong implement the Canton System to prevent foreign 
interference in China affairs.34 However, as mentioned earlier, we believe that the 
real reason behind the Canton System was control of local Chinese trade – despite 
making foreigners the main official target of the policy.   
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Furthermore, the Qing government primarily sought to assure the stability and 
unity of the Middle Kingdom in the hands of a foreign (Manchu) dynasty. It therefore 
rejected many opportunities for foreign trade and avoided any possibly destabilizing 
course of action. As a Manchu government, the Qing emperors and the nobles of the 
Eight Flags came from the Changbai Mountain area, located north of Shanhaiguan. 
They had conquered the Central Plains of China and become rulers over the 
(majority) Han population.35 In order to establish their authority and rule, they had 
violently suppressed any resistance of the Han people and even exiled some Han 
overseas. The Qing government always enforced a very strict control over the people 
to prevent the emergence of rebellious forces.36 Foreigners were confined to Macao 
and were expressly forbidden from living in Guangzhou. Migration to other regions 
and provinces, even in the case of Chinese businessmen bringing their foreign wives 
back home, was strictly regulated and required official authorisation – without which 
heavy penalties could be incurred.37 The Qing rulers were also concerned that exiled 
Han people would collude with foreigners in order to undermine the regime.  
In 1755, the British merchant ship that sailed to Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, gave 
the Qianlong emperor cause for concern. It was reported by local officials that there 
were forty boatmen on the merchant ship without pigtails.38 Although it was 
confirmed afterwards that part of the ship crew were foreigners living in Macao, 
Qianlong might have had reason for concern. The pigtail was the traditional hairstyle 
of the Manchu people – most of the head was shaved, leaving a small disc of hair that 
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was tied back. However, cutting hair was forbidden in traditional Han culture. In 
order to establish the rule and authority of the Manchu government, the Shunzhi 
emperor issued the “hair shaving order” in 1644: “Keep your hair or keep your head” 
[liú tóu bù liú fà, liú fà bù liú tóu 留头不留发，留发不留头].39   
Over the following centuries, small-scale uprisings and riots would occasionally 
occur and the Qing rulers paid special attention to this “hair identity” as a symbol of 
allegiance to the empire: it thus became a way of controlling the population.40 James 
Flint tried to appeal to the emperor after failing in his enterprise to trade in Ningbo, 
although he was very likely to have had ulterior motives. He was finally convicted for 
his attempt to denounce corruption and was banned from Macao for three years.41 
Emperor Qianlong believed that, compared to Ningbo, Canton was far more 
accessible for long-distance driving into the hinterland of the Central Plains, and 
therefore better placed to control overseas trade and potential Han incursions.42 For 
all these reasons, the Canton System continued until the Opium War erupted and the 
British forced the Qing government to open other ports up to trade. 
 
The self-sufficiency of the Qing economy and the exchange of goods at the 
Canton Customs 
The rigid implementation of rules to control trade in south China, first through the 
customs system established by the Kangxi emperor and continued by his son 
(Yongzheng), and then through Qianlong’s imperial edict limiting foreign trade to 
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Canton, had a negative impact on the state’s capacity to eradicate corruption and 
smuggling. Despite the increasing number of officials, growing institutions, and 
expanding list of imperial decrees issued to supervise local and overseas trade, the 
state remained powerless to control the complex trade networks that had evolved. 
Indeed, corruption was widespread in the very institutions designed to stamp out illicit 
activities.43 Despite this, Canton continued to be a major hub for foreign trade – in 
fact, it was the world trade centre in south China during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – with exports of Chinese goods to Asian and western regions 
and imports from the West. The accumulation of American silver in the hands of 
Chinese private merchants was the main driver, on a micro-scale, that boosted 
exchanges, allowing local traders to increase their family fortune and reputation, 
while escaping the control of the Qing state. 
The memoranda that the local officials provided to the emperors, allow us to trace 
this world trade network, which connected the Guangdong region to Europe through 
western merchant ships (either arriving from Europe through the Indian maritime 
routes, or from the Americas, through the Pacific routes), bringing silver to China and 
exporting Chinese goods (mainly tea, silk and porcelain). These western traders also 
introduced goods to China’s coastal regions, from which they were distributed to 
inland China. The goods listed in the memoranda included woollen fabrics, spices, 
black lead and medicinal herbs, among other commodities. During the Yongzheng and 
Qianlong periods, the Canton Customs would collect several hundred thousand silver 
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taels in tax revenues annually. There was a commodity commercial tax [shāngshuì 商
税] for outbound ships and a foreign tax [yángshuì 洋税] for overseas merchants. A 
report sent to the emperor in 1743 suggests that “from each foreign merchant ship we 
can collect an income of about ten thousand taels of silver, every year there will be 
around 10 to 15 foreign ships to come.”44 In the tenth year of the Yongzheng 
emperor’s reign (1732), the Canton Customs collected 309,107 taels of silver. During 
Qianlong’s fortieth year of reign (1775) the tariffs brought in 541,863 taels and by his 
60th year (1795) income had almost doubled to 1,171,911 taels (see figure 2).45   
Even though in 1757, when the Canton System was established, there was a 
sudden dip in the annual tax revenues of the Canton Customs, the general trend of the 
annual tax revenues was positive over the second half of the eighteenth century (see 
figure 2). This holds particularly true during the late 1770s, when the “formal 
mercantile cartel of the Co-hong [gōng háng 公行]” was consolidated, allowing 
foreign supercargoes to permanently reside in Canton – which, in turn, increased the 
circulation of foreign goods, and therefore, the annual revenue of the Canton 
Customs.46 The Canton Customs tax revenue reports were submitted on an annual 
basis following the seasonality of sea-faring and agricultural activities. The tax bureau 
could thus start the account in any month of the year and finish it twelve months later. 
For this reason, the annual data series was calculated with a double entry (biannual 
basis), but in fact the accounting system was made annually. These are the so-called 
“year-node divisions,” which referred to the solar periods in which the Chinese lunar 
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calendar is divided and, as the Canton Customs reports show, the month of calculation 
for every year was arranged randomly depending on the seasonality, forecast or 
predicted weather conditions for agricultural activities and maritime trade.47   
 
Figure 2: Annual Tax Revenue of Canton Customs from the Kangxi to Qianlong 
Era 
 
Authors’ own elaboration. Courtesy of ZPZZ, FHAC, ref. number 04–01–35–0307–005, 04–
01–35–0307–022, 04–01–35–0307–026, 04–01–35–0307–030, 04–01–35–0317–025, 04–01–
35–0318–046, 04–01–35–0321–027, 04–01–35–0323–025, 04–01–35–0325–013, 04–01–35–
0327–011, 04–01–35–0331–002, 04–01–35–0331–002, 04–01–35–0340–009, 04–01–35–
0340–008, 04–01–35–0346–028, 04–01–35–0346–028, 04–01–35–0352–030, 04–01–35–
0353–045, 04–01–35–0357–039, 04–01–35–0358–040. 
 
The expansion of the global maritime trade and the growing demand for Chinese 
goods by western traders in the second half of the eighteenth century led to a 
substantial rise in China’s foreign trade tariffs.48 In contrast to Europe’s enthusiasm 
for commodity trade, the Qing rulers, mainly the Qianlong emperor, reinforced 
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paradigm in China of the European mercantilist ruler, even a physiocrat, because of 
his view of China as a self-sufficient economy and determination to foster national 
production. “There is nothing we don’t have that we need from you,” he told Lord 
Macartney, who had been sent on mission to China in 1792 by the British King 
George III.49 The imperial policies were designed to increase capital accumulation 
and paid close attention to commodity exports. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a relevant share of the state’s 
fiscal revenues came from land tax, as well as custom duties. Most regions of China 
relied on agricultural production, as capitalism only really developed in the more 
trade-oriented south-eastern coastal regions. Overall, the economy of Qing China was 
primarily based on the ecological environment, which was essentially independent of 
– or geographically isolated from – the international trade system.50 In the 1760s, 
Qianlong even restricted the export of silk products, as he believed that overseas 
traders were exchanging Chinese silks and introducing foreign goods that could affect 
the demand for local products in domestic markets.51 This resembles the mercantilist 
policies issued during the same period by European monarchs.52 Moreover, the Qing 
government retained stricter control over food exports. The local Hong merchants and 
brokers were forbidden from selling large amounts of grain to foreign traders; ship 
cargoes were inspected to prevent exports of large quantities of foodstuffs. Local 
officials were required to report regularly to the emperor that they had stringently 
enforced the ban on excess grain outflow.53 These measures were surely motivated by 
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the food shortages experienced during the Qing dynasty.   
But was it really true that China needed nothing from other countries, as the 
Qianlong emperor had boasted to Lord Macartney? They certainly needed grain and 
American crops. During the Qianlong period, there was a significant population boom 
which set China on the path of the so-called “high level equilibrium trap.”54 The 
population of China had reached 400 million by the end of eighteenth century.55 Food 
shortages were particularly acute in the south-eastern coastal areas, which were 
densely populated but had relatively little cultivated land.56 Farm economies were 
heavily contingent on climate conditions. Unfavourable weather conditions (such as 
drought) could have disastrous impacts on the food supply of large populations.57 
The introduction and consumption of American crops (potato, maize, sweet potato), 
which had been introduced in China by the end of Ming dynasty through the Manila 
galleons, helped to mitigate such food shortages.58 
Food shortages were also a common catalyst for public uprisings, which the Qing 
government was desperate to prevent. It had therefore considered various ways of 
averting a famine. To counteract the high-level equilibrium trap, wine prohibition 
became one of the measures taken to manage food shortages. Since traditional 
Chinese wine was made from grain, limiting cereal production for consumption as a 
food, not as a beverage, was a strategy to combat the scarcity of food. Farmland was 
therefore to be reserved for the cultivation of grain, not for viticulture.59 Moreover, 
the Qing government also encouraged local merchants to trade with neighbouring 
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Asian regions to open up a supply of food and grains to Chinese regions.  
A memorandum written in 1761 by Li Shiyao 李侍尧, the governor of the 
Guangdong and Guangxi province, notes:   
referring to the previous case of the Fujian province, merchants who brought 
more than 2,000 dan of grain from foreign countries could get an official 
rank promotion. The previous year a businessman named Wang Chao, from 
Chenghai county, used his own capital, took the vessel of Chen Fushun, and 
bought 2,646 dan of rice from Annam. In accordance with the regulations of 
2000 dan or more, he should be awarded with promotion to the ninth rank.60  
The ninth rank was the lowest official rank, and while businessmen who obtained 
official titles acquired no special political power, they invariably experienced a rise in 
their wealth and reputation as a result of these promotions. This privilege was passed 
on to later generations. To some extent, it also helped them to forge closer 
relationships with local officials, shaping a dense network of socio-economic and 
political power. As well as buying grain, since 1745 the Qing government had also 
attempted to buy copper from foreign businessmen to mint coins.61 In 1749, foreign 
coins were popular in the market of the Zhejiang area. Zhejiang’s governor, Fang 
Chengguan 方承观, thought these illegal coins should be destroyed and called on 
other provinces to do the same. However, Qianlong believed that these coins should 
be recycled and re-minted.62 
To sum up, we observe that the Qing rulers, specifically the Qianlong emperor, 
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were keen to import food and raw materials from foreign countries, but also European 
luxury goods such as wool, glass, handicrafts, mirrors, clocks (indeed, the emperor 
was an avid collector of clocks, which he housed in one of the pavilions at the 
Imperial Court), as well as foreign wines and liquors. These western goods were 
extremely sought after, especially by the imperial family, who were the main 
consumers of western luxury goods, but also among the elites and Guangdong 
officials. This exemplifies a trickle-down effect that begins at the highest echelons of 
Chinese society, with the emperor himself and his court, moving down to the gentry 
who wanted to emulate this consumption of new and exotic luxury goods.63 Each 
year, the emperor ordered Guangdong officials to purchase supplies for the Imperial 
Household Department, including local products from the Guangdong region and 
goods from foreign traders. The Kangxi emperor also asked Guangdong officials to 
collect information from foreigners, and even kept a group of foreigners, the Jesuits, 
close to the Beijing court to serve the imperial family. His son, Yongzheng, despite 
having officially banned Christianity from China, housed a group of Christian 
missionaries at the Beijing court to work as scientists, artists and technicians.64  
The large number of historical documents that we have analysed at the FHAC, 
mainly relating to the policies and memoranda of different emperors, can also shed 
some light on the personalities and preferences of some of the emperors. For example, 
the Kangxi emperor (1661–1722) had a particular fascination with western culture, 
science and technology, as well as foreign goods. He was especially interested in 
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astronomy and geography. He appointed the Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest [Nan Huairen
南怀仁] as the Astronomical Bureau Officer [qīn tiān jiān jiān zhēng 钦天监监正] to 
revise the astronomical calendar and in 1674 he ordered the Great Universal 
Geographic Map [kūn yú quán tú 坤舆全图].65 When foreign scientists came to 
Guangdong, Kangxi was eager to meet them, telling local government officials: “Let 
them come to Beijing as soon as possible.”66 The Guangdong administrators were 
well aware of the Kangxi’s interest in western culture and in foreigners and local 
officials often informed him about the arrival of westerners.   
The Yongzheng emperor (who reigned from 1723–1735), Kangxi’s son, was more 
uncompromising than his father. His attitude to finances was more cautious and he 
was particularly concerned with the reform of China’s economy. Unlike his father, he 
had little interest in science and western luxury goods. He issued a ban on the 
purchase of ivory products due to its excessive cost.67 He believed that the Canton 
Customs should work to increase tariffs, and not to foster overseas trade and 
introduce foreign goods. Indeed, the customs duties of the Canton Customs were an 
important source of income for the national treasury. Nevertheless, Yongzheng relied 
on Guangdong officials to purchase overseas textiles and medicinal herbs for the 
Imperial Household Department.68  
Yongzheng’s son, Qianlong (1736–1795), inherited great wealth from his father. 
The Qianlong emperor – like his grandfather – had a taste for exotic goods, and he 
often asked local officials to procure luxury items and high-quality crafts. According 
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to a 1758 report sent to Qianlong from the governor of Guangdong and Guangxi 
Provinces, Li Shiyao, the emperor had asked Guangdong officials to “purchase for me 
clocks, western gold beads, exotic furnishings, gold threads, new style objects, etc. 
Don’t worry about the cost.”69 Later, Li Shiyao purchased several gold-plated 
decorations, striking clocks, musical clocks, wall clocks, snuff bottles, glassware, 
drawing tools, and pearls for him and noted that “we have spent 6,612.6 taels of silver 
on these, minus the 15,558.4 spent last year for the Duanyang festival, of the 30,000 
taels now there are 7,828.9 taels left. Should I give the money to the Ministry of 
Revenue or the Canton Customs vault?” The emperor replied: “Keep it and use it in 
the future.”70  
The next year Li Shiyao submitted another report explaining that he had spent 
2,503.1 taels looking for agate stone goods.71 This demonstrates the conspicuous 
consumption fostered by the Qianlong emperor, for whom high costs was not an 
issue. He took great delight in acquiring rare and luxury foreign goods, despite 
banning their consumption for the rest of the country. Today, the museum of the 
Forbidden City exhibits the exquisite collection of western clocks and exotic 
ornaments of the Qianlong era. These items are unrivalled in quality and taste. Indeed, 
Qianlong was rather unenthusiastic about the beaux gestes offered by the British 
envoy, Lord Macartney, as his own collections surpassed the items the diplomat had 
brought to impress the emperor.  
The gentry and wealthy businessmen of the Qing dynasty also showed great 
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interest in luxury western goods. In 1743, as part of an investigation into corruption, 
the home of the Canton Customs supervisor, Zheng Wusai, was searched and a great 
quantity of antiques, jewellery, as well as western ornaments, glassware and exotic 
silk fabrics were discovered. The officials responsible for handling the case proposed 
that these recovered illicit goods should be sent to the Imperial Household 
Department and presented to the imperial family.72 We might infer that the emperor’s 
enjoyment of foreign luxury goods influenced other officials, but the thriving business 
of southern local officials, from Guangdong, also shaped Qianlong’s desire for luxury 
goods. There was thus a “trickle up” effect as well as a “trickle down” effect for the 
consumption of luxury goods, which triggered corruption and the misappropriation of 
tax funds. In addition, we can assume that not only officials and gentry, but also the 
social elite were motivated by this drive for the conspicuous consumption of western 
luxury goods, which had become symbols of wealth and social distinction.  
 
Conclusion 
The body of data used for this research includes previously overlooked historical 
sources from the imperial archives, the FHAC, which houses very rich sources such 
as edicts, memoranda, imperial correspondence, among others, that constituted the 
main channel of communication between the emperors and local officials in China’s 
provinces. This study uses these primary sources to analyse the rationale and 
foundations behind the Canton System, concentrating in particular on: 1. how 
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Canton’s unique geographical location contributed to shape a tight micro-network of 
local traders; 2. how it became a stable and unofficial economic system that fostered 
long-term foreign trade and capital accumulation, allowing local family groups and 
traders to thrive; 3. more specifically, how the Qing government used the Canton 
System not only to control foreign traders and foreigners in one single location, but 
also to watch the mainly Chinese local merchants whose wealth was rising through –
often illicit – alliances and partnerships with foreign merchants. Behind this official 
system, with Canton the only port in China for foreign trade, the emperors and the 
entire Guangdong network of traders, local officials and gentry, as well as the Qing 
ruler, sought to create an economically stable regime, despite it being – in practice – 
run by unofficial activities, smuggling, and the widespread diverting of tax funds to 
line private pockets. China had a history of feudal rule for thousands of years and had 
formed a relatively independent and complete economic system with its own 
particularities. In other words, it was an economic micro-cosmos of merchants and 
officials who created a “system within the system.”   
In the early and mid-Qing period, before the outbreak of the Opium War and 
mainly during the Qianlong emperor’s reign, the Qing government did not officially 
foster a large-scale foreign trade. In reality,  Qianlong eagerly encouraged local 
officials to purchase foreign goods and luxury items which provided a high profit for 
the state revenues. A self-sufficient economy was the main, official, objective of the 
Qing rulers. Their conservative and rigid attitude aimed to maintain a stable political 
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regime and avoid social turmoil or uprisings. They feared the possible impact of a 
reform of the fiscal system, which would have involved dismissing local gentry and 
traders from the unofficial but highly lucrative system. For this reason, as discussed, 
the Qianlong emperor restricted the exports of silk and grain and encouraged the 
imports of goods.  
Qianlong was also aware of the need to import some food and natural resources 
to avoid environmental degradation and to preserve local economic structures. 
European empires had a marked maritime-trade orientation. In contrast, due to the 
immense geography of the Middle Kingdom (mainly through the Manchu expansion 
to western regions), the Qing emperors sought to unify this vast mass of land, an 
inland empire that was expanding westward, and to provide enough domestic supplies 
to the population. However, the Qing emperors still revealed their personal choices 
and preferences through their consumption of luxury western goods, a practice which 
spread throughout the upper ranks of the social hierarchy, and “trickled down” to the 
lower social classes, including local officials and businessmen.  
By analysing the imperial edicts housed at the FHAC, we gain a better 
understanding of the functioning of foreign trade in China during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, mainly in the southern provinces such as Guangdong, from a 
micro-perspective, as well as why the economic Macao-Canton axis came to be a 
global trade hub. However, these sources have some obvious limitations, as they do 
not provide data on the economic circulation of these goods from suppliers to 
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consumers. Although the total tariff incomes of the Canton System can be calculated 
annually, we are not able to determine the precise typologies of goods that were being 
taxed. Second, although we have an approximation of the kinds of luxury goods that 
were purchased by (or for) the emperors, it is difficult to estimate the real expenditure. 
However, the trend toward conspicuous consumption and the large expenditure on 
luxury goods can be deduced as a symbol of power. Also, a lack of data prevents us 
from quantifying consumption across different social groups. A further limitation is 
the fact that the FHAC has lost and misclassified some historical sources of the 
Kangxi emperor’s reign, as well as some relevant foreign-politics files. Ongoing 
research providing data on import and export tax bills, merchant contracts and letters, 
local gazetteers, as well as manuscripts by scholars will help close the above-
mentioned gaps and unveil a clearer picture of trade in imperial China, the Canton 
System and Canton as a global entrepôt.  
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